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Abstract
Not only corporate but also sovereign debtors, in particular developing coun-
tries, may get into ﬁnancial diﬃculties. Contrary to corporate issuers, they decide
themselves if they continue to fulﬁll their debt obligations or convert their debt.
I analyze the value of a default-risky sovereign bond in a setting in which foreign
trade is reduced in case the country does not fulﬁll its obligations. Comparing
the costs of debt service with the value of the punishment via foreign trade, the
country voluntarily decides when to reorganize its debt. Knowing this threshold
the value of a sovereign coupon-bond can be calculated.
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11 Introduction
Bonds of sovereign issuers often are not default-riskless like those of western economies.
This can be seen in Latin America and in Eastern Europe in the last years. It is not
only corporate debt that is risky, sovereign borrowers may also suspend or even stop
payments on their ﬁnancial obligations. This may be sequel to revolutions in the
borrowing country like in Russia, where after the October Revolution the new Soviet
government decided to stop payments on old tsarist bonds in 1918. Normally sovereign
debtors stop their payments on external debt because they have got into economical
and ﬁnancial diﬃculties. More than 80 % of sovereign defaults are connected to cur-
rency crises.1 One example is the Russian Crisis in the summer of 1998, when the
Russian Ruble was devaluated against the US Dollar and Russia defaulted on some
Dollar-denominated bonds. Also some Mexican Peso-Crises in the 1980s and the early
1990s lead to defaults in Mexico as for example in 1982.
Sometimes currency crises are hidden behind a ﬁxed exchange rate. In Argentina the
Argentinean Peso has been linked to the US Dollar for the last ten years, and the Ar-
gentinean government promised to possess at least one US Dollar for each circulating
Peso. However, in order to hold Pesos, banks oﬀered higher interest rates for assets
held in Pesos, making it diﬃcult to sustain the ﬁxed exchange rate. Yet, a devaluation
increases the value of US-Dollar-denominated external debt. The system broke down
in December 2001, when the Argentinean government stopped all payments on public
external debt and then devaluated and ﬂoated the Argentinean Peso in 2002. This was
somehow expected by ﬁnancial markets, which have considered Argentina as almost
insolvent for some months. So they traded Argentinean government bonds with a high
risk premium. Also, the rating of these bonds became very low. Before Argentina
suspended their payments, Argentinean bonds were only rated B by Standard and
Poors, compared to AAA for German or US bonds. This is reﬂected in a very high
yield-spread of Argentinean bonds with regard to default-riskless bonds. In November
2001 the spread reached more than 4000 basis points for a maturity of two years and
continued growing in 2002 due to the ongoing crisis.
There are great diﬀerences between the yields of bonds of diﬀerent sovereign borrowers
in the world, even for the same rating-class.2 These diﬀerences may reﬂect diﬀerences
in the national interest rate policies of the central bank, but mostly they reﬂect the dif-
ferent risk premiums of diﬀerent debtors due to diﬀerent market opinions with respect
to the default probabilities of the government bonds. All South and Latin American
1See Reinhart (2002).
2E. g. the credit spread between Swiss and French 5-year bonds, both rated AAA by Standard
and Poors, is 150 basis points (27.02.2002).
2sovereign debtors are rated BBB (Standard and Poors) or worse, whereas the credit
spread varies between only 100 for Mexico and more than 2000 for Argentinean bonds.
The spreads may vary a lot over time, e. g. Russian bonds that are rated B+ reduced
the credit spread since the partial default in 1998 from more than 4000 to around 300
basis points now.
In contrast to corporate debtors a state that cannot pay its obligations or that is highly
indebted cannot be liquidated; the country’s assets cannot serve as collateral for the
debt. What is more, there is no bankruptcy code for sovereign debtors. Sovereign debt
is not a legally enforceable contract, although the IMF is planning to install a legal
framework.3 Sovereign debtors can decide themselves whether to stop or to continue
their payments. Mostly they do not simply declare default but they try to convert
their debt, e.g. to rearrange the time structure of payment obligations or to cut oﬀ the
face value of the bonds in a way that the creditor has no real choice whether to accept
the oﬀer or not.
What forces sovereign debtors to pay their ﬁnancial obligations? If a creditor cannot
be sure that the debtor will repay his debt plus interest, he will not lend his money
save with a risk premium. The premium rises in case a default occurs, and next time
the debtor wants to borrow money, he has to pay higher interest rates. So a default
increases the costs of future access to the credit market. This in turn will reduce the
potential future wealth of the economy. The defaulting debtor also loses reputation,
making it more diﬃcult to get new money on the credit market. This may also re-
duce international trade opportunities, because trading partners are afraid that their
exports cannot be paid. In an empirical analysis Rose (2002) shows that on average a
debt-renegotiation with the Paris club4 was followed by a reduction of bilateral trade
of about eight percent a year in the following ﬁfteen years.
In addition to that, own exports or foreign domiciled assets may be seized sequel to a
default. Oil exporting countries like Venezuela can use exports as collateral, so in case
of default parts of their exports are conﬁscated. This can link international delivery to
lending to create an enforceable penalty reducing the shortfall-risk for the creditor. For
example, in the second half of the 16th century the Genoese lenders of King Philip II
of Spain imposed great sanctions for non-payment. Conklin (1998) shows a sanction-
3As a response to the Argentinean crisis in December 2001 the IMF is trying to avoid great defaults
in future by imposing an international insolvency procedure as for corporate debtors so that claims
on sovereign debtors can also be prosecuted.
4The Paris Club is an informal group of creditors, amongst them are as well the greatest industri-
alized countries as developing countries. Renegotiations with the Paris Club are normally associated
with IMF-programs.
3based explanation for the successive debt renegotiations5 during his reign.6 However,
80% of sovereign debt of developing countries is not collateralized. Since World War
II the importance of trade sanctions to enforce sovereign debt contracts grew as well
as the importance of foreign trade of newly industrializing countries with industrial-
ized countries.7 International sanctions due to a default could be that the sovereign
borrower will not get any new credit from international organizations like the IMF.
Although sanctions are sometimes diﬃcult to impose, a reduction of foreign trade and
therefore a reduction of the economic activity of the defaulting country often is the
consequence of a default.
In order to evaluate if a country has a debt burden that is too high and is therefore
susceptible to defaults or debt rearrangements, there are several criterions. For devel-
oping countries the World Bank says that there is a debt overhang if the ratio of debt
to GDP is more than 25%. Compared to the criteria of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) allowing for a ratio of 60% just in order to ensure the stability of the monetary
union this is a very low value. However, besides the level of output and the exchange
rate the volatility of these variables plays a role, too. With a higher variation in the
exchange rate it is more probable that the value of the future debt services increases
so much that the state cannot aﬀord interest payments and decides to declare default
or to reorganize its debt.
The aim of this paper is to derive a valuation formula for defaultable sovereign bonds
in a model taking not only the credit risk into account but also exchange-rate dy-
namics. Contrary to corporate issuers, sovereign countries decide themselves if they
continue to fulﬁl their debt obligations or stop paying. Mostly they do not simply
declare default but they try to convert their debt, i.e. to rearrange the time structure
of payment-obligations. Note that this is realistic, because at the moment there are
no legal enforcements, like a bankruptcy code to compel the borrower to fulﬁl its debt
obligations.
In the corporate credit risk literature there are two main approaches to model the
5Altogether there were four renegotiations of debt during the reign of Philip II.
6King Philip II of Spain (1556-98) borrowed extensively during his reign to ﬁnance his military
activities, therefore he needed to transfer specie from Spain to its troops ﬁghting outside Spain. In
the bankruptcy of 1575 when Spain reached its debt ceiling, the Genoese cut oﬀ new lending. Because
Philip II broke oﬀ negotiations, the Genoese imposed an embargo on all currency transfers between
Spain and its troops in the Low Countries, where he was engaged in a major campaign against Dutch
rebels. Unpaid for more than a year the troops mutinied, leading to a great military defeat. Therefore
Philip II capitulated to the lenders, leading to an agreement in 1578. For more details see Conklin
(1998).
7Approximately 90% of Mexico’s foreign trade is with industrialized countries (Bulow and Rogoﬀ
(1989)).
4default event: so called intensity-based models and structural models. Intensity-based
models model the default event via the ﬁrst jump of a point process. They diﬀer in
the way the point process is modelled, e.g. Duﬃe and Singleton (1997) uses a gen-
eral point process, whereas Lando (1998) uses a Cox-Process. In these models a given
credit-spread-structure is reached via calibration of the model. These models can eas-
ily be applied to sovereign debt, but they do not use any relation between the default
event and fundamentals like the exchange rate or the foreign reserves of the central
bank. So they deliver no information about possible hedges. For rating models the
small number of defaults in the last ﬁfty years poses a problem, because this makes
it diﬃcult to estimate default probabilities and recovery rates for the diﬀerent rating
classes.
In structural models, going back to Merton (1974), a default occurs when the ﬁrm’s
assets are no longer suﬃcient to cover the debt obligations. So the default occurs if
the ﬁrm value undershoots an exogenous threshold. In Merton (1974) this default only
may take place at maturity. This was extended to cases in which the default is possible
before maturity by Black and Cox (1976) and to stochastic interest rates by Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz (1995) as well as Sch¨ onbucher (2000) who derives a closed-form solution
in a special case of stochastic interest rates.
We analyse the value of a default-risky sovereign bond issued in a foreign currency like
Euro or US-Dollar in a structural model without interest rate risk in the style of Leland
(1994), who derives an optimal capital structure and yield spreads for corporate bonds.
In Leland (1994) the default triggering value is endogenously derived. The ﬁrm has
a tax advantage of issuing debt. However, debts also increase the risk of default and
therefore costs for a bankruptcy, diminishing the value of the ﬁrm. This trade-oﬀ leads
to an optimal amount of debt, maximizing the ﬁrm value.
Applying this to a sovereign borrower, the problem is to ﬁnd an equivalent for the value
of the ﬁrm. We assume that the government wants to maximize a country’s wealth,
i. e. the capitalized value of all goods and services produced by the country minus
the capitalized value of its debt obligations. This means that the government balances
social costs of interest payment and economic consequences of declaring default. The
sovereign country borrows money on the foreign capital market to ﬁnance domestic
expenditures and international trade. The aim of borrowing is a higher wealth of the
domestic economy, i.e. a higher domestic GDP. On the other hand the economically
desired increase is associated with costs of debt and interest payments. So the govern-
ment tries to reduce this burden and considers whether to stop paying interests or to
continue. However, a default or another reduction in interest payments causes a lower
domestic GDP in future periods. Thus, a default not only increases a country’s wealth
due to power payment obligations but also reduces its wealth because of its negative
5eﬀects on the future output. Therefore the sovereign debtor should reorganize its debt
if the reduction of the amount of future debt service payments exceeds the economic
disadvantages the country has due to this unilaterally declared partial suspension of
payment.
For modelling, a disadvantage of a macroeconomic variable like GDP is that it is not
available on a daily basis and what is more, normally it is only available with a lag of
at least two or three months, even in industrialized countries. Another diﬃculty is the
problem of uncertainty about real GDP. Even if a developing country publishes data
about its GDP, these values are not really reliable data. Besides output, the exchange
rate also inﬂuences the relation between lost output and the costs of debt payment.
The exchange rate is available on a daily basis, and furthermore there are more changes
in the exchange rate than in GDP if there is no ﬁxed-rate regime. So it is rather the
exchange rate than a low output that pushes a sovereign country into a payment crisis.
The dynamics of the exchange rate also allow hedging in a position linked with the
default risk.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we specify the evolution of the out-
put of the sovereign country and its payment obligations. Furthermore the dynamics
of the exchange rate are presented to link the debt denominated in foreign currency
with the value of the output in domestic currency. Section 3 presents the decision of
the government and the optimal decision about the default-threshold. Also the total
value of the outstanding debt services in domestic currency is presented. In section
4 an explicit coupon-bond is valuated using the optimal threshold. Finally section 5
summarizes.
2 General dynamics
The aim of this paper is to value default-risky debt issued by sovereign borrowers. The
debt is placed on international capital markets8 that are assumed to be frictionless.
Furthermore we assume perfect capital markets where continuous trading is possible.
So there is risk-neutral valuation of ﬁnancial contracts under the respective martingale
measures on the domestic market of the borrower as well as on the foreign market. The
link between the domestic market and the foreign market is given by the exchange rate
dynamics.
8Normally this is done via banks. In addition, sovereign countries borrow directly from inter-
national institutions and other sovereign states, but this debt is not valued or traded on ﬁnancial
markets.
6The government of the sovereign state issuing debt on international markets maxi-
mizes the wealth of the economy it represents, i.e. the capitalized value of all goods
and services produced by the country minus the capitalized value of its debt obliga-
tions. This drives the decision of the government, whether it continues to fulﬁll its debt
obligations or reorganizes its debt in order to reduce its interest burden. However, the
latter incurs higher costs for the acquirement of future debt; sanctions are imposed and
international trade is reduced. All these measures reduce the wealth of the economy.
Comparing the costs of the debt service with the value of the punishment via a reduc-
tion of foreign trade, the government chooses an optimal critical value of output for
which it reorganizes its debt. This means that the debtor voluntarily decides when to
reorganize its debt, determining the default threshold on which the value of the debt
depends endogenously.
Let (Ω,F,P) be a common ﬁltered probability space with subjective probability-
measure P and ﬁltration F. On both the domestic market and the foreign market
there exists an equivalent martingale measure, PD and P∗ respectively. In the follow-
ing, we deﬁne how the output of the borrowing country evolves over time, dependent
on the decision of the state whether to pay its obligations or not. These obligations are
quoted in foreign currency, so the exchange rate between domestic and foreign currency
is introduced.
2.1 Dynamics of the output
Let Y D
t denote the value of the output of the country of the sovereign debtor, denom-
inated in national currency9 at time t. Y D
















t is the growth rate of output, σD
Y a constant d-dimensional vector of volatilities
and W D
t a d-dimensional Brownian motion under the domestic equivalent martingale-
measure PD. The growth rate of output is assumed to be constant and equal to
the short rate rD. This means that on average the economy grows with the rate of
intertemporal substitution. The dot in σD
Y ·dW D














9The superscript D stands for variables denominated in domestic currency, all variables in foreign
currency are without a superscript.
7So long as the sovereign borrower fulﬁlls its payment obligations the output evolves
according to (1). We assume that no real default is possible,10 as the state only re-
organizes its debt. For simplicity this reorganization11 only may take place once. If
the country does so, sanctions and a loss in reputation will take place. This loss raises
the costs for the access to the capital market in the future, reducing future production
possibilities. Also, it gets more diﬃcult to acquire new credits from international or-
ganizations like the World Bank or the IMF. If the IMF cuts down all his credits this
may result in severe problems for the government, which needs foreign currency for its
national budget.
Furthermore, foreign trade is reduced in case of default or reorganization of debt. On
the one hand potential exporters fear a seizing or a conﬁscation of their exports as
payment in place of the payment the state did not make. On the other hand importers
may not have enough foreign currency to pay for the imports and foreign exporters
may shorten the time of payment making imports more expensive. Sanctions by in-
ternational organizations or higher customs on foreign trade in order to punish the
government are possible as well, but they are relatively rare, sanctions are mostly de-
ployed for political or military reasons like the prevention of terrorism or human rights
abuses.12
Most of these eﬀects have a stronger impact in the near future. Over time the country
gains back its reputation and therefore negative impacts of the default reduce. Further-
more sanctions only take place in the near future after a debt reorganization. Therefore











where γ and δ are positive constants, γ < 1. The instantaneous reduction of output
after renegotiation is reﬂected by the factor γ, higher values stand for higher reductions.
The coeﬃcient δ captures the persistence of this reduction, where lower values of δ
mean longer persistence.13 Therefore, the accumulated value of all goods and services
10So far in the majority of cases the borrowers have oﬀered to the bondholders an exchange of the
old bonds in new ones with new conditions like lower interest rate or face value or longer maturity,
reducing the payment obligations of the debtor. It is also relatively rare that countries default on its
international ﬁnancial obligations, they typically renegotiate their debt through the Paris Club (see
Rose (2002)).
11In the following, default always stands for a reorganization of debt.
12See Rose (2002).
13Rose (2002) estimates the reduction of bilateral trade following a debt renegotiation with the
Paris Club. He ﬁnds a signiﬁcant decline of eight percent in bilateral trade, persisting for around
ﬁfteen years. This reduction stays at a relative constant level but for longer lags the inﬂuence of a
debt renegotiation on bilateral trade is not signiﬁcant.
8produced by the country subsequent to a default is reduced. Only in the long run the
time path of output will reach the same value it would have reached in case no default
had occurred.
The present value of the expected14 future output ﬂow at time of default τ, given the

































ρ − rD − γ
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where ρ stands for the discount factor of the government15 and ρ > rD, ηD is a positive
constant.
2.2 Payment obligations
The sovereign borrower is assumed to have external debt with inﬁnite maturity. This
can be understood as a permanent rolling over of maturing debt so that no ﬁnal pay-
ments exist. Except for this new debt due to the rolling over mechanism no new bonds
are issued by the state. It is also assumed that no foreign debt is ever replaced by
other, e.g. domestic bonds. The debt and all interest payments are denominated in
foreign currency. For simplicity we assume that all debt is denoted in the same foreign
currency. At each moment t in time the debtor has to pay interests in foreign currency
Ct, as long as no reorganization has taken place. The payment obligation is assumed
to be constant over time.
The government can decide to reorganize its debt once. That means that the face value
and, as a consequence of that, total interest payments are reduced by a constant factor
14The expectations with respect to the domestic martingale-measure PD are taken conditional on
the information on the time τ-value of the output.
15If ρ = rD, then the present value of the future output will be inﬁnite, but the loss due to
reorganization remains ﬁnite as long as ρ + δ > rD.
9such that payment obligations at time t after the reorganization amount to ωC only,
with ω such that 0 < ω < 1.
This reduction can also be understood as a permanent reduction of the future interest
rates the borrower has to pay or a mixture of lower interest rates and lower face values.
2.3 Exchange rate
The foreign debt of the borrowing country is denominated in another currency than
output. Thus, we need the exchange rate Xt between these two currencies that allows
the conversion of foreign market cash ﬂows into units of domestic currency. One unit of
domestic currency is worth Xt units of foreign currency, where for reasons of arbitrage











t is a d-dimensional Brownian motion under the foreign equivalent martingale-
measure P∗, r the foreign short rate and σX a d-dimensional vector of volatilities.
The connection between the two Brownian motions enables to rearrange the dynamics
of the output. Therefore, it follows for the output-dynamics using the Brownian motion













To evaluate all dynamics in the same currency and under the same martingale measure
let Yt := Y D
t Xt be domestic output in foreign currency. With the Itˆ o-formula the



















=: Yt (rtdt + σY · dW
∗
t ). (8)
3 The decision of the sovereign
The government decides itself when to reorganize its debt. Similar to Leland (1994) an
optimal critical value for the domestic output is calculated, at which the organization
should take place. To do that, we derive the general solution for the value of a ﬁnancial
contract dependent on the output process. With two explicit boundary conditions both
10the value of the discounted future debt services and the present value of the future
output is calculated, both dependent on the threshold triggering the reorganization.
So ﬁnally the value maximizing the country’s wealth can be determined.
For every ﬁnancial contract F(Y ) conditional on the process Y following the Ito-formula




















Under risk-neutral valuation16 the expected return on every ﬁnancial contract must
equal the risk free interest rate. So for a contract with constant payment outﬂow of f














! = rF(Y )dt. (10)
Fortunately, there is no time dependency in the contracts here, so that the ﬁrst addend
cancels out. This makes it easy to ﬁnd a solution. The explicit solution also depends
on boundary conditions that remain to be speciﬁed later.
Therefore the following diﬀerential equation17 must hold for the value of the future






2DY Y + f − rD = 0. (11)
The general solution of (11) is of the form
D(Y ) = A1 + A2Y
λ1 + A3Y
λ2, (12)
where the tqo exponents λ1 and λ2 are the zeros of the quadratic equation r(λ − 1) +
1




















16See Black and Cox (1976).
17Subscripts denote partial derivatives.




Y + σXk2. (14)
Therefore, if we deﬁne λ := λ2, the solution of the diﬀerential equation (11) simpliﬁes
to
D(Y ) = A1 + A2Y + A3Y
λ. (15)
To calculate the explicit solution for the value of the outstanding debt services, two
boundary conditions must be speciﬁed. The debtor chooses itself the critical value of
the output triggering the default. If the output stays above this value, it will continue
paying its payment obligations. When the threshold is reached from above, reorgani-
zation takes place. Thus, if the threshold is reached the discounted value of the future
interest rate payments is ωC/ρ.18 Otherwise, if the output gets relatively high with
respect to the critical value, reorganization gets more and more unlikely so the present
value of the payment obligations tends to the value it would have if no reorganization
was possible: C/ρ.
This gives the following two conditions:
(i) If Y reaches YB, then D(YB) = ωC
ρ
(ii) If Y → ∞, then D(Y ) → C
ρ
From (ii) follows A1 = C
















. Inserting into (15) gives the present value of the future








, and with the
exchange rate X the present value of the debt services in domestic currency dependent



















18The time τ value of a constant payment stream of ωC at all dates after τ with discount factor
ρ > 0 is
R ∞
τ e−ρ(τ−t)ωCdt = ωC
ρ .
12Analogously the discounted value of expected future output G(Y ) in foreign currency






2GY Ydt − rG = 0. (18)
The general solution of (18) is G(Y ) = B1Y + B2Y λ.
If no reorganization of the debt takes place at all, the output level in foreign currency
follows the dynamics according to (8) and at each point in time t the present value of















where the discount factor the government ρ is assumed to be greater than the foreign
short rate r, and expectations are taken under the foreign martingale-measure.
If the threshold YB is reached from above, reorganization takes place. Due to sanctions
and a reduction in foreign trade as well as higher costs of reﬁnancing at the capital
market output falls in the following periods to a lower level19 according to (3). There-
fore, under the foreign martingale-measure the present value of the discounted future
output in foreign currency at the moment YB is reached is
YB
ρ−r (1 − η).20 So the total
discounted expected loss of the output is η
YB
ρ−r, 0 < η < 1. However, if the output
gets very high, reorganization is extremely costly because the loss in output in case
of default rises with the level of the output. So reorganization gets more and more
unlikely if the output grows higher, such that the present value tends to the value in
(19). So a default is more probable in poor developing countries than in rich industrial
countries.
This leads to two boundary conditions for the present value of the expected future
output in foreign currency:
19The reduced output also indices an increase in the price level, because of the macroeconomic
relationship V M = Y P, where V represents the velocity of money, M the amount of money in
circulation and P the price level. Because V and M cannot adjust quickly, an output reduction
induces an increase of the price level. This in term reduces the worth of the domestic currency, that
means X will fall.









13(i) If Y = YB, then G(YB) =
YB
ρ−r (1 − η))
(ii) If Y → ∞, then G(Y ) → Y
ρ−r
From (ii) it follows immediately that B1 = 1















B . So together with the two
boundary conditions the solution for the present value of the expected future output




























The problem for the sovereign borrower is to decide at which level YB it should reorga-
nize its debt. The government tries to maximize the wealth of the domestic economy,
so it does not like the loss in output that appears after a reorganization of debt. How-
ever, it also seeks to reduce the burden on the economy due to the interest payments.
Clearly, it should never declare default if the expected loss in output after reorganiza-
tion compared to the case in which it would never reorganize its debt is higher than
the total expected gain from reorganization. The expected loss depends on YB, so a
critical value ¯ YB can be derived. For values of the output in foreign currency above ¯ YB




C (1 − ω)
ρ
, (23)
leading to the critical value
¯ YB = C
(1 − ω)(ρ − r)
ηρ
. (24)
But if the output in foreign currency reaches this value from above the sovereign
borrower has not only the choice between reorganization now or never, it can also
14wait a little bit more hoping that the output will raise again and default if it falls
more. So the wealth of the economy may be increased if the government decides to
continue paying its debt obligations. The value of ¯ YB maximizing the wealth of the
economy is the value that maximizes the diﬀerence G(Y ) − D(Y ):
max
YB
























The ﬁrst order condition leads to




































Because of λ < 0 this value is smaller than ¯ YB, so it is optimal not to stop the interest
payments immediately if ¯ YB is reached but to continue further until the output in



































ρ + δ − r
γρ
. (29)
This value can be reached due to a fall of domestic output, but also because a deval-
uation of the home currency increases the critical value. This is due to the payment
obligations in foreign currency. In case of a devaluation the domestic output loses in
15value relatively to the interest obligations. Thus, in case of a currency crisis a default
or reorganization becomes more likely to occur. Of course this value is proportional to
the payment obligation in domestic currency, so only the relation between output and
interest obligations measured in the same currency matters.
Obviously the critical value depends negatively on the exchange rate. Higher uncer-
tainty as well of the future output as of the exchange rate dynamics also lowers the
threshold YB
∗. If the volatility of output is higher, the chance of a strong economic
rebound is higher, so the loss in future output in consequence of a reorganization of
the debt are higher as well. Analogous, if the sovereign borrower already is in ﬁnan-
cial distress, a higher volatility of the exchange rate increases the probability that the
interest payments in foreign currency will get much cheaper in future times.
Furthermore, the parameters determining the reduction of the output after a reorga-
nization inﬂuence the threshold: A higher value of γ, meaning a higher reduction of
output due to a default, increases the costs of default, therefore reduces the critical
value YB
∗. Similarly, higher values of δ reduce the time, the reorganization has a neg-
ative impact on the output and therefore reduces the costs of reorganization. That
means YB
∗ is increasing in δ.
Because of δ > r, YB
∗ depends negatively on the government’s discount-rate ρ. The
greater the discount-rate is, the less the government is interested in the future output
development and payment obligations. The reduction of the payment obligation re-
mains the same over time, but the output reductions subsequent to a default are higher
in the nearer future. Therefore, with a higher discount-rate the discounted beneﬁt due
to the renegotiation carries less weight relatively to the discounted costs in terms of
lower output. Hence if the sovereign borrower has a high discount-rate, he should re-
organize his debt at higher output-levels than if he has a higher appreciation of the
future.
The inﬂuence of the interest rate on the threshold value is not clear. For low interest
rates the critical value of the output is increasing in r and for higher interest rates the
threshold falls again. The highest value of the reorganization threshold is reached for























To calculate the total value of the country’s payment obligation in domestic currency








































p ∈ [0,1], can be interpreted as the default probability. It is increasing in the output-
volatility and decreasing in the actual output and the interest-rate. Rearranging the
terms in (31) leads to an alternative formulation, where 1
X
C
ρ is the payment obligation
















this means that for the default probability it is only the value of the output relative to
the payment obligation that matters.
4 Valuation of a coupon bond
Total foreign debt of the state was assumed to live inﬁnite or always be rolled over at
maturity, with a constant payment obligation at each moment in time. We can regard
total debt as the sum of a great number of diﬀerent coupon bonds that are always rolled
over at maturity, so there is no real maturity of the debt. If the number of these bonds
and therefore the amount of interest payment dates is high enough, the assumption
of a continuous payment stream can be used as approximation for this more realistic
case. With this assumption the above model can be applied and an optimal default
or reorganization threshold of the output, dependent on the exchange rate, can be
derived.
With this threshold default probabilities can be calculated and therefore the value of a
defaultable coupon-bond. To do that the coupon-bond with payments at intermediate
dates is separated in diﬀerent zero-coupon-bonds. Each of them has maturity at the
respective coupon payment date and a face value equal to the coupon or the ﬁnal
payment at maturity.
Let the face value of the bond be K and the coupon be c. The diﬀerent coupon
payments are due at t1,...,tn = T, where T is the maturity of the total bond. With
this the value of this risky bond at time t is:
¯ B (t) =
n X
i=1
K ¯ B (t,ti)1{t≤ti}c + K ¯ B (t,T), (34)
17where the values with the bar denote risky values and those without default-riskless
values, and ¯ B (t,ti) is the value of a defaultable zero-coupon-bond at time t with
maturity ti and face value 1. The indicator-function only respects the case that the
valuation date t is after the maturity of respective zero-coupon-bond.
Each of these zero-coupon-bonds of the total bond can be valuated separately. The
default or reorganization occurs, if Y D
t ≤
YB
Xt. In this case the write-down is ωK.
Taking this into account, the value of one zero-coupon-bond with maturity ti at time
t is:























under the foreign martingale-measure. So only the default probabilities need to be





































t + σYWt (37)






t+σYWt. For a Brownian
motion Bt with drift: Bt = µt+σWt the distribution of the running minimum is known.
























where N(·) stands for the standard normal distribution function. With this the prob-


































































18Putting together the relation between the value of one risky and one default riskless


















































and therefore by summing up the diﬀerent zero-coupon-bonds we get the total value of
a default-risky sovereign coupon bond at initial time t = 0, dependent on the current
value of the output and the exchange rate:
¯ B (0) =
n X
i=1
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We present a structural model in the style of Leland (1994) to value credit risky bonds
of a sovereign issuer. The sovereign state issues debt on the foreign capital market and
has a constant payment obligation in foreign currency. The borrower himself decides
when to declare default, i.e. when to reorganize its debt to lower the interest burden.
The aim of the government is to maximize the wealth of the economy. There are no
legal enforcements to compel the borrower to pay, but if he does not pay, this will have
a negative impact on the country’s foreign trade in the future. It will be more diﬃcult
and therefore more expensive to get new money on the international market, which,
in turn, reduces the amount of future imports and the production possibilities for the
economy. There might also be a direct eﬀect on exports that could be conﬁscated in a
19foreign country as substitution for outstanding debt payments.
Comparing the costs of the debt service with the value of the punishment via output
and foreign trade reduction, the country voluntarily decides when to reorganize its
debt, i.e. to declare default. The optimal threshold for domestic output is calculated,
dependent on the exchange rate, the payment obligation, the write-down and some
other parameters like the discount factor of the government. In a currency crisis the
threshold can raise drastically when the exchange rate falls. This brings the threshold
value closer to actual output and therefore increases the default risk.
In contrast to output the exchange rate is immediately observable on a daily basis.
Therefore, a position in the country’s debt on the foreign capital market can be hedged
with the exchange rate. If in addition output is replaced by the domestic stock index
that could serve as a proxy for expected future gains of the economy, a second hedging
instrument is available for the debt of the sovereign issuer.
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